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Trends in Communist Propaganda

18 Dec 74

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# **TRENDS**

## **In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

18 DECEMBER 1974  
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## ENERGY

## MOSCOW CAUTIOUS ON FORD-GISCARD TALKS, HAILS NEW OPEC PRICE

Initial brief Moscow reports on the 14-16 December Martinique summit meeting between President Ford and French President Giscard d'Estaing treated factually and circumspectly their agreements on measures in the energy field. At the same time, Soviet commentators hailed as "very fair" the new decisions at Vienna by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to unify the price of oil effective 1 January and increase oil duties for foreign monopolies. Moscow's well-established aversion to Western initiatives that would lead to unified groupings of oil-importing states, and Soviet support to the OPEC members in any "confrontation" that might ensue in negotiations between OPEC and Western blocs, have been reiterated in comment on the Vienna OPEC session. Such comment has been aimed at the United States and its November initiatives to form an international energy agency.

FORD-GISCARD  
COMMUNIQUE

A 16 December TASS report on the communique published at the end of the U.S.-French summit meeting concentrated on the energy aspects of the document, noting only briefly that the two leaders also discussed a "wide range" of world problems including East-West relations, the Middle East and Southeast Asia situations, and economic and monetary-financial problems. TASS acknowledged that the two leaders, "in an attempt to reach a compromise essential for resolving" U.S.-French differences on energy questions, agreed to hold a conference of oil-importing and oil-exporting countries "at the earliest possible date." The TASS accounts pointed out that the French-U.S. agreement calls for preliminary coordination within "existing international organizations" of energy conservation programs and the development of alternative energy sources, followed by "intensive" consultations to achieve a single position at the conference with oil exporters.

"Profound differences" between France and the United States on the energy issue had been stressed in Soviet reports and comment on U.S. moves in mid-November to create an international energy agency. For example, a 17 November PRAVDA dispatch by Rusakov highlighted French opposition to the U.S.-proposed "bloc" to "fight the oil-producing countries" and noted disagreements also among other European and Asian countries. Rusakov added that U.S.

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policy on the issue sought to "overcome the U.S. energy difficulties at the expense of oil-producing countries," thus retaining a U.S. "leading role in the capitalist world" under the "pretext of joint action." Moscow media attributed to Secretary Kissinger the formulation of the basic propositions for the plan to create "a united bloc of capitalist countries." Subsequent Moscow comment alluding to the International Energy Agency--formed on 15 November--as the "Club of 16" described it as an "instrument of pressure" on oil-producing states and, without mentioning Secretary Kissinger, noted that "a number of American statesmen" have sought a "harder attitude" toward the Arab countries.

Soviet antipathy toward any "united front" of oil-importing nations was reaffirmed in an 18 December Melnikov PRAVDA commentary. According to the TASS summary of his remarks, Melnikov described the International Energy Agency as a bloc of "developed capitalist countries opposed to oil-producer countries," adding a veiled warning that the OPEC members "will not remain indifferent" to "confrontation" plans being worked out by "imperialist circles." In what seems implicit criticism of the new U.S.-French coordination agreement--his comment being timed immediately after the Martinique summit--Melnikov argued that the attempt "by certain circles of the West" to secure a solution to the energy issue from "obviously unilateral positions" is "more than disputable."

Moscow's caution in treating the new U.S.-French agreement is consistent with its past indifference and even negative reaction toward earlier Western-led efforts to convene international conferences on the energy question. For example, Moscow from the outset disparaged the U.S.-initiated Washington energy conference in February 1974 as well as smaller follow-up meetings called by the United States. The sketchy first reports on the U.S.-French communique provide no direct evidence of Soviet criticism or opposition to such a conference, but the thrust of comment on the OPEC price moves suggests that Moscow prefers to see bilateral oil agreements between OPEC and oil-importing countries, rather than conference confrontations between OPEC and an organized grouping of importing countries.

OPEC VIENNA PRICE MOVES	Soviet commentator Timoshkin told Arab listeners of Moscow radio on 14 December that the 13 December Vienna OPEC decisions unifying the oil price on 1 January and raising the tax for foreign monopolies were "very fair," representing an OPEC effort to "weaken the negative effect" of the capitalist world's inflation upon the national economies of the oil-producing states. Timoshkin added that the unified
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oil price would broaden possibilities for "direct trade relations" between the OPEC and oil-importing countries and thereby help greatly to "curb the looting practices of the international oil monopolies." He noted that the Vienna OPEC actions came against a background of an intensifying "provocative propaganda campaign" against Arab and other oil producers, "particularly in the United States," that sought to blame oil producers for capitalist economic difficulties. Consistent with Moscow's traditional defense of higher oil prices, Timoshkin described the OPEC actions as a "just struggle for their legitimate rights" to achieve a "fair share" of income from their natural resources, "taken from the profits of "imperialist cartels which exist by plunder."

TASS English reports on the OPEC actions on the 13th and 14th were much less doctrinaire, noting that the increased returns for OPEC producers "should be viewed as a measure to make good the damage" from current inflation, to offset increased spending by OPEC countries on industrial goods and foodstuffs from Western nations, and to publicize the "huge profits" by "oil tycoons" and thereby prevent them from "endlessly forcing up prices of oil products."

MILITARY ACTION  
AGAINST ARAB OIL

Moscow has exploited, particularly for Middle Eastern radio audiences, U.S. press speculation about possible Western military intervention in Arab oil-producing states as well as CENTO naval maneuvers in November in the Arabian Sea region. Moscow's ostensibly "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress on 3 December told Arab listeners of U.S. press discussions about a U.S. plan to "occupy oil regions of the Arab world by force of arms," going as far as specifying the Arab states targeted for such action and noting that U.S. military forces have undergone simulated exercises to prepare for desert-region warfare. The radio added that while the Arab states viewed these developments with "great vigilance," they continued their "oil onslaught on the positions of the imperialist monopolies" to gain control of their oil resources. A 28 November Moscow broadcast to Iranian listeners discussing mid-November CENTO naval movements in the Arabian Sea region said their purpose was "to prepare for the occupation of oil resources," and saw in this a U.S. plan to "intimidate the progressive Arab states" in the region, which in turn proved there were "aggressive designs" beyond intimidation.

Moscow's handling of such speculation for domestic audiences, however, has been much more restrained. A 16 November Russian-language report, describing U.S. speculation on possible "desperate military action" against Arab oil fields, optimistically declared that

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"sober-minded politicians of the Western countries" realize the "hopelessness" of such methods and seek to take account of the "new realities."

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## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

## PODGORNY, RED STAR REGISTER DISSENT FROM DETENTE MOOD

Discreet demurrals from the prevailing mood of optimism that has characterized Soviet official attitudes toward U.S.-Soviet relations have been registered by Podgornyy in a Dushanbe speech on 29 November, and by RED STAR in a major article on 21 November.\* Podgornyy, speaking a few days after the Vladivostok summit, limited his acknowledgment of the results to a mere endorsement of the official party-government statement of approval and stressed instead the need for caution in assessing the international situation and the foreign policy problems that remain to be settled. RED STAR, writing on the eve of the summit, whose agenda was widely understood to have included SALT as one of its subjects, paid barely a word of deference to detente and stressed instead the need to insure continued qualitative improvement of Soviet strategic weaponry.

PODGORNY SPEECH Podgornyy's brief remarks on Vladivostok were limited to two brief paragraphs which paraphrased passages from the official party-government statement of approval which had been issued the day before. They were sandwiched between two longer passages which presented a darker picture of the international situation. The first recounted the history of the emergence of the "peaceful coexistence" principle, stressing the alleged persistence of Western opposition to this concept, and ascribing the recent moderation of Western policy in this regard to the "strengthening economic and defense might of the Soviet Union" and the "vitality of its Leninist foreign policy." The second warned against overestimating the results of Vladivostok, stressing the continued activity of opponents in the West, counseling caution in assessing Western intentions, and noting issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations that remain to be settled.

There are several aspects of these remarks that appear to contradict prevailing Soviet positions on foreign policy or at least to offer an alternative perspective on critical points.

+ First, Podgornyy stressed the limited nature of detente; he treated it as though it were still in its infancy, an experiment

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\* The full impact of Podgornyy's remarks was not reflected in summaries of the speech carried by TASS and Moscow radio; the full text of the speech as published in IZVESTIYA on 30 November has just become available in translation.

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still to be tested. "It goes without saying," he said, "that we are not establishing cooperation with the capitalist countries at a stroke, or by any means on all questions." This, of course, is inconsistent with Soviet rhetoric of recent years, particularly the repeatedly stressed conviction that the favorable turn in U.S.-Soviet relations has reached the point where it can be made "irreversible."

+ Second, he seemed to implicitly criticize the deal under which the Soviet Union was reported to have agreed to raise quotas on Jewish emigration in exchange for the U.S. Administration's support for removing trade restrictions. Although the criticism was veiled and formally addressed to "certain foreign individuals," it seemed to carry an implicit rebuke to those in the Soviet Government who would contemplate such a deal. Denouncing the Western pressures in this regard as "overt interference in the sphere of internal state policy," he concluded with the ringing declaration that "our internal affairs have never been and will never be a subject for political bargaining."

This interpretation of Podgornyy's remarks assumes added plausibility in the light of the TASS statement of 18 December and the accompanying publication of Gromyko's letter to Secretary Kissinger which deny that any deal was made on this issue. It seems safe to assume that these actions were preceded by extensive debate in the Politburo. Thus Podgornyy's remarks would have been appropriately timed to affect the outcome of the debate in the Politburo.

+ Third, he entered a strong caveat on the question of the future prospects of detente. He insisted that detente was a two-way street and that further progress would depend on the extent to which both sides observed the "traffic regulations." In this connection, he drew attention to various trouble spots--the Mideast crisis, the Cyprus situation--which he said were due to the "concern" of the enemies of detente.

+ Finally, he used phraseology in introducing these cautionary notes which carried a polemical ring. "It would be intolerably nearsighted," he said, "to fail to take into account" these various negative aspects of the international situation. Such challenging phrases have long been regarded by Kremlinologists as tell-tale signs of internal controversy.

What factors in the current political situation might have prompted Podgornyy to distance himself from Brezhnev on foreign policy can,

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of course, only be conjectured. A plausible theory might be that rumors of Brezhnev's intention to resign in the near future, which have been reported in the West, have prompted renewed maneuvering in the Politburo. In this light, Podgorny's speech could be seen as an effort to position himself to arbitrate the succession. Such a role would not be out of character for Podgorny, since he has carefully kept his distance from Brezhnev on policy issues in recent years. Both on internal economic policy and on foreign policy he has taken positions which are more traditionalist than Brezhnev's. Such a position would be likely to recommend itself to the Soviet leaders in a period of transition.

RED STAR ARTICLE      Although lacking the polemical overtones of Podgorny's speech, the RED STAR article of 21 November was even more jarringly out of tune with the prevailing need of the pre-summit publicity. Written by two military professors, and presented under a heading usually reserved for major theoretical items, the article was wholly devoted to the theme of military preparedness. It presented an argument which strongly resembles the views which the Soviets usually ascribe to the "military-industrial complex" in the West.

Its main themes included the contentions that modern military technology has greatly increased the importance of the time factor in modern strategy, that this has led to increasingly sophisticated weapons, and that this in turn has speeded the process of obsolescence and renewal. The conclusion derived from all this is that the Soviet Union must be prepared to keep pace in the qualitative arms race. As the article puts it: "All this calls for an increase in the amount of scientific and experimental design work and for the raising of the technical complexity of military-technical equipment." In plain terms, more R&D and plenty of MIRVs.

Although the article does not specifically mention MIRVs (nor any other specific weapon system), this seems a fair interpretation of the above statement. Moreover, it is supported by the fact that the immediately preceding passage had pointed out that one of the main driving forces of the arms race was the "competition between defensive and offensive methods of armed warfare." MIRVs were originally conceived as a means of combating ABMs and are still rationalized in terms of their presumed effectiveness against military targets, such as reinforced concrete structures, and so on.

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These features of the article, plus its timing, suggest that it may have been intended to register the military's interest on the eve of the summit in retaining a free hand for continued technical upgrading of the Soviet strategic forces. The fact that the conclusions were presented as being grounded in Soviet "military science"--the sphere of Soviet military theory which is preeminently the preserve of professional military thought--tends to reinforce this speculation.

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## CYPRUS

## MOSCOW EXPRESSES HOPE FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS

With President Makarios' 7 December return to Cyprus following his stay abroad after the 15 July coup, limited Moscow comment has looked hopefully toward negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots while holding in reserve the Soviet proposal for an international conference on Cyprus. At the same time, comment has cautioned that progress will be slow and difficult. Moscow, which favored the prolonged intercommunal dialog conducted by Kliridhis and Denktash since 1968 as a proper method for seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem, has reported without comment their discussions this fall, limited to humanitarian issues and suspended since 4 December.

IZVESTIYA commentator Melor Sturua on 15 December, speaking on Moscow radio's weekly roundtable program for domestic listeners, viewed Makarios' return as "proof" that Cyprus is already "becoming more stabilized." He identified three criteria for "helping to find a correct and positive solution" to the Cyprus problem: "stabilization of the constitutional order on Cyprus, withdrawal of all foreign troops, and successful and fruitful talks between the Greek and Turkish communities." TASS on the 12th had reported a statement issued by the Cyprus communist party, AKEL, on the archbishop's return, emphasizing that "a form of constitutional structure for Cyprus can be found at a conference table" by Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Moscow has, however, recognized that a negotiated political settlement will not be easy to achieve. A 9 December TASS report pointed out that "there are still great difficulties and obstacles on the way to reestablishing constitutional law and order." PRAVDA's Drobkov, in a foreign-language commentary on the 12th, saw signs of hope in Makarios' return and the "joint line" adopted by Nicosia and Athens, but observed that because of Cyprus' "enemies"--the "North Atlantic bloc" and "imperialist agents" on Cyprus--normalization would "not be easy" and a political settlement would entail a "tenacious struggle."

SOVIET PROPOSAL,  
NATO "SOLUTION"

Concurrent with Makarios' return, Moscow has not been pressing its 22 August proposal to discuss the Cyprus problem within the UN framework. As recently as 28 November, Moscow had formally reiterated its call for an "international conference" on Cyprus in the Soviet-Zambian communique issued that day. The Soviet-French communique on

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Brezhnev's talks in Paris, issued on 7 December, the day of Makarios' return to the island, advocated that a settlement be reached through unspecified "negotiations." And the communique on Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu's talks in Moscow, released on 13 December, said only that the sides supported Cyprus' independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity "so that the domestic problems of the Cyprus people" may be settled peacefully.

Soviet delegate Malik did reiterate the call for a conference in the 13 December Security Council debate, which dealt with the six-month extension of the UN peacekeeping forces' mandate and the General Assembly's 1 November Cyprus resolution. According to TASS' account of the session, Malik said that UN resolutions on Cyprus could be implemented by "convening an international conference on Cyprus on a widely representative basis."

The idea of a NATO-sponsored solution has again been rejected by PRAVDA's Drobkov. As reported by TASS on 17 December, Drobkov portrayed NATO "proposals" to mediate the Cyprus problem as carrying an implied promise to "adjust" the Cyprus conflict in Greece's favor "in return" for Athens' return to the NATO military ranks. Reiterating a standard theme, Drobkov denied that NATO could solve the crisis, claiming that it was fully concerned with "imposing its will on Cyprus, and at the same time also on Greece." Moscow in its coverage of the recent NATO ministerial meetings in Brussels did not report Secretary Kissinger's remark at a news conference on the 13th that he was "more hopeful than before that progress on the Cyprus crisis is possible" after his talks in Brussels with the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers.

**TURKISH, GREEK ROLES** While the major organs of the Soviet central press continue to criticize Turkey's role only implicitly, KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on 6 November and SELSKAYA ZHIZN on 5 December were a shade more outspoken in pointing to Turkish obstinacy toward a political settlement. The former noted that while Greece endorsed the Soviet proposal to discuss the Cyprus situation at an international conference, "Turkey, fearing to remain in isolation, opposes this." SELSKAYA ZHIZN, commenting on a Turkish foreign ministry spokesman's statement that talks between the two communities would be interrupted if Makarios returned to the island, maintained that "soberminded individuals, even in Turkey, are beginning to realize that the situation that has been created on the island cannot last forever."

Moscow has continued to voice vehement opposition to partitioning of the island. NEW TIMES observer Vladimir Shmarov, in a 24 November

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Moscow radio commentary, outlined Soviet concern in pointing out that if the "notorious Attila line" is not abandoned, "two administrations may take root, which will in turn lead to the annexation of one part of the island by Greece and the other part by Turkey."

Soviet media have indicated cautious approval of the new Greek Government's policy vis-a-vis Cyprus. PRAVDA on 3 December, in a report on the Athens talks between Karamanlis and Makarios, said that they confirm the resolve of Greece and Cyprus to find a solution "in a peaceful way." In further approval of Karamanlis' policies, Moscow radio on the 10th identified as one of the "positive changes" being carried out by his government the "pledge to achieve a solution in Cyprus based on the preservation of its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity." And Sturua on the 15 December roundtable program, in an apparent allusion to Greece's traditional support of enosis--Cyprus' union with Greece--noted that Athens is now "taking a more realistic stand" on Cyprus.

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## VIETNAM

## DRV ARMY ANNIVERSARY ANTICIPATED IN COMMENT, EVENTS IN HANOI

Vietnamese communist media are devoting predictably voluminous and authoritative attention to the upcoming 30th anniversary of the North Vietnamese army (VPA). There have been major articles by Chief of Staff Senior General Van Tien Dung and Colonel General Song Hao, Chief of the VPA General Political Department, which have been carried by Hanoi radio as well as by DRV newspapers and journals. Hanoi papers have also published a lengthy account of the history of the VPA and an article on the communist military forces in South Vietnam by a southern military commentator under the pseudonym "Cuu Long." This is the first known article attributed to Cuu Long since April 1972, when in the midst of the communist spring offensive he wrote an article stressing the significant role of guerrillas in supporting main force units. Only the Song Hao article, discussed below, is available in full translation at this writing. However, available reports indicate that Van Tien Dung's article deals with the critical problem of coordinating the requirements for domestic construction and defense.

Recent North Vietnamese public events--some in connection with the 22 December VPA anniversary--have prompted a series of appearances by North Vietnamese military leaders. After having been out of sight since mid-August, Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung reappeared at a soccer game on 27 November. Dung appeared subsequently on 6 December, along with Defense Minister Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap and Colonel General Song Hao, to receive a visiting PLAF delegation; and on 15 December he attended an army sports competition marking the forthcoming VPA anniversary. Dung had appeared fairly regularly during the last half of 1973 and early 1974, taking on some of Giap's traditional functions during the latter's extended absence from public view from July to September 1973 and from October 1973 to May 1974. Giap made no appearances in June or July, but has been regularly active since the end of August.

The surfacing of some military leaders who do not regularly attend public functions revealed some previously unknown promotions. Last April's official announcement that a series of promotions had been granted gave no comprehensive list; the information has been gleaned indirectly with the sporadic mentioning of various officers identified with a higher rank than previously.\* Among these latest

\* Promotions revealed earlier are discussed in the TRENDS of 1 May 1974 pages 2-3, and 7 August 1974, pages 22-25.



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revelations was the identification of army logistics chief Dinh Duc Thien as a lieutenant general when he appeared at the 15 December sports event. A 14 December visit by the PLAF delegation to the command of the People's Armed Public Security Forces prompted the appearance of a previously unrevealed major general--Nguyen The Tang, who represented the police forces.

#### DRV GENERAL STRESSES ARMY'S COMMITMENT TO REVOLUTIONARY GOALS

The lengthy article by Col. Gen. Song Hao, Chief of the VPA General Political Department, was given broad dissemination befitting a formal anniversary treatise; it was broadcast by Hanoi radio in daily installments from 8 through 14 December, published in the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN on the 16th, and printed in the December issues of the army journal TAP CHI QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and the party journal HOC TAP. The article discussed in conventional terms many subjects raised by Song Hao in past articles--praising the army for its obedience to the party, its determination, discipline, and unity, its good relations with civilians, and its achievements in study and training. At the same time, some of the points made by Song Hao could be read as an argument for a greater North Vietnamese commitment to achieving victory in the South.

In analyzing the experience of the resistance against the French, Song Hao indicated that both domestic construction and fighting can be undertaken simultaneously, noting that the armed forces and people "conducted the resistance while building the country." He again focused on his priorities in outlining the army's revolutionary virtues, maintaining that the army "strongly opposed all vile moves to incite it to seek material interests" and vehemently advocating determination to achieve success:

Our cadres and combatants have always advanced and have never retreated. All phenomena of half-way revolution, irresoluteness in coping with the enemy, lack of revolutionary offensive spirit, lack of determination to overcome difficulties and hardships, and individualism are inconsistent with our army's revolutionary nature and traditions.

Song Hao later returned to this same theme, reiterating that the Vietnamese army and people have "never retreated" before an enemy "no matter how powerful he has been," and have "always tried by

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all means to advance and have resolutely struggled and achieved victory." Clearly indicating his formula for success, he added:

Engaging in revolution means launching offensives. Only when we launch offensives against the enemy can we defeat it, build and develop our strength, protect the revolutionary gains, and defend the North.

Song Hao did not go on to indicate that an offensive to drastically change the situation in the South is likely in the near future. On the contrary, in his concluding passages he suggested that the army has many obstacles facing it before it can achieve its ultimate objectives. He expressed confidence that the army would advance to "total victory" but noted that "our combat task still faces hardships and fierce challenges" and "our undertaking to build our people's army into a regular, modern army remains difficult."

Song Hao dwelt upon the army's tradition of fighting throughout Vietnam, in effect justifying commitment of North Vietnamese units in the South. While couched in general language which "predictably avoids any explicit mention of the VPA presence in South Vietnam, Song Hao's support for their role was clear. He asserted impassionately that "our country is one" and "each inch of land is part of the flesh and blood of the Vietnamese country" and is a "sacred part of the fatherland that every patriotic Vietnamese must strive to protect." Repeatedly he pointed out that the armed forces have fought "on any battlefield, distant or near," have "rushed to any place the enemy has been," and "have walked thousands of miles to very distant areas."

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## PRC - KOREA

## PEKING CONTINUES HARD LINE TOWARD U.S. TROOPS IN KOREA

Recent Peking comment on the UN debate over the Korean question has further demonstrated the PRC's steadily sharpening criticism of the continued U.S. troop presence in South Korea. Following the defeat, with a tie vote, of the North Korean-backed resolution demanding the withdrawal from South Korea of foreign troops under the UN flag, a 12 December PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article attacked the U.S. position on the question as "lies." Commentator further labeled as "deceit" (wan chuan shih chi jen chih tan) the U.S. argument that its troops are in South Korea to defend the Korean Armistice Agreement, but are not there under UN auspices and are not guilty of any interference in the South's affairs. Referring to the U.S. backed proposal which was passed by the General Assembly's First Committee, Commentator charged the U.S. had "perpetrated various tricks to railroad through . . . an indefensible resolution" which "covers up" crimes of U.S. aggression and intervention in Korea, creates a "pretext" to prolong the stay of U.S. troops in the South, and "unduly" refers the question of the dissolution of the UN Command to the Security Council.\*

On two previous occasions in the past two months the Chinese have used the UN forum to accuse the United States of deception on the Korean question. Chiao Kuan-hua, in a 2 October UN speech, used exactly the same language as Commentator (wan chuan shih chi jen chih tan) in denying the U.S. assertion that the UN Command cannot be withdrawn because of a threat from North Korea. More recently, on 29 November Chinese UN representative Huang Hua called the U.S. contention that its troops were in South Korea to maintain peace a "glaring reversal of the truth." Commentator echoed other propaganda in demanding that the United States withdraw its troops, halt military assistance to the South, and end its "connivance" with the South's provocations against the North, but put no time frame on withdrawal. A greater sense of urgency regarding U.S. withdrawal was voiced at a Peking banquet, on the occasion of the 25 October anniversary of the entry of the Chinese People's Volunteers into the Korean War, by Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien, who called for U.S. troops "to pull out of South Korea without delay."

\* A few days before the vote, a 6 December NCNA correspondent's report had blasted as "gangster's logic" the U.S. position that its troops would remain in South Korea regardless of the outcome of the UN vote because they were there under the U.S.-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty. The report dismissed the treaty as a "mere scrap of paper," which had been signed "illegally."

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## PRC - THAILAND

## PEKING HAILS THAI CP ANNIVERSARY, MAINTAINS BANGKOK CONTACTS

Peking media's practice this year of giving increased attention to the Thai Communist Party (CPT), while at the same time according sustained coverage to relations between the PRC and the Thai Government, was demonstrated most recently on the 32d anniversary of the CPT. Peking's report on 9 December of a 1 December CPT statement on its anniversary, and acknowledgment in August of the anniversary of the Thai insurrection, contrast with Peking's ignoring of both anniversaries in 1973.\*

NCNA's 9 December summary version of the CPT's 1 December statement on the Thai communists' 32d anniversary included a reference---omitted in NCNA pickups of other CPT statements earlier this year---to "drive away the U.S. imperialists" from Thailand; however, the NCNA report ignored several other more specific CPT references to U.S. misdeeds as well as all references to the Sanya government.

Peking's selective reporting of the CPT statement also implicitly indicated approval, for the first time, of political struggle in Thailand as well as armed struggle, presumably reflecting Peking's perception of the Sanya administration's weakness. All references to political struggle had been dropped by Peking in its coverage of the August Thai insurrection anniversary editorial, originally carried by the Peking-supported clandestine radio, Voice of the People of Thailand. NCNA's 9 December pickup of the CPT 1 December statement included the CPT claim that "our party would like to cooperate with political parties, organizations and personages who support and join the people. . . ."

The NCNA report also carried Peking's first mention of the CPT's ten-point policy statement issued on the party anniversary in 1972. The statement had been issued on the 30th party anniversary in 1972, just after Peking had taken its first steps to improve PRC-Thai state relations by welcoming official Thai envoys to China. Peking only gradually began to reiterate its support for the CPT after Thanom's ouster in October 1973, at a moderate pace reflected in its failure to commemorate the anniversary last December.

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\* For background see the TRENDS of 2 October 1974, page S1, and of 14 August 1974, page 20.

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The NCNA report's retention of the CPT reference to "U.S. imperialism" actively operating in Thailand was the first such Peking media treatment of this issue since September 1973, when NCNA carried the CPT's message of congratulations on the 10th CCP Congress. Peking has continued to carry factual accounts of U.S. troop withdrawals from Thailand, and in January 1974 reported an anti CIA demonstration in Thailand which noted both U.S. CIA and military roles in Thailand.

PEKING-BANGKOK  
RELATIONS COVERAGE

Peking's somewhat increased attention to the CPT has not been accompanied by any reduction in its treatment of relations between the PRC and Thai governments. A Thai trade mission is now in China; NCNA on 17 December reported the unanimous vote of the Thai National Assembly on 6 December to repeal a decree which banned trade between the two countries. It quoted the Thai foreign minister as saying that the two countries "will develop normal trade relations." Peking has also given considerable coverage to the visit to Thailand of a Chinese basketball team, with an 8 December NCNA report quoting Thailand's deputy foreign minister as envisaging that the development of relations "will lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations." And a Peking broadcast in Thai on 12 December even quoted the Thai Air Chief Marshal Thawi Chunlasap as making "an admirable statement" on the permanency of Thai-Chinese friendship. Recent NCNA accounts have reported the struggle for better conditions by Thai peasants, but while noting their call for Thai government departments to take action, NCNA has carefully avoided reporting any call for the government's overthrow.

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## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

## PRAGUE PARTY DAILY CARRIES NEW DENUNCIATION OF DUBCEK

A new vitriolic attack on deposed CPCZ First Secretary Alexander Dubcek, in an 11 December RUDE PRAVO editorial article, marked the latest episode in the continuing power struggle between moderates and hardliners in the Czechoslovak regime. The article was written to commemorate the fourth anniversary of the party document issued by the December 1970 CPCZ plenum assessing the events leading up to the August 1968 Soviet intervention. Describing Dubcek and his colleagues in language markedly contrasting with that usually employed by CPCZ General Secretary Husak, the article further highlights the increased assertiveness of the Bilak-style hardliners in that it is the first such article to appear on the anniversary of the 1970 party document. The article was preceded last month by an 8-22 November Prague radio series which leveled an unusually extensive attack on liberal emigrees who had fled Czechoslovakia in the wake of the intervention.

The December 1970 party document, entitled "Lessons From the Crisis Development in the Party and Society After the 13th Congress of the CPCZ," roundly denounced Dubcek and declared for the first time that the Warsaw Pact intervention had been carried out at the request of unnamed CPCZ Central Committee members. It was not made public until mid-January 1971, and the month-long delay in its release was widely believed to have been due to Moscow's insistence on inclusion of the thesis that the 1968 invasion was requested by the Czechoslovaks themselves. Reflecting the continued sensitivity of the issue, the current RUDE PRAVO article did not revive the thesis of the alleged invitation, instead praising in general terms "the timely assistance of our closest socialist allies."\*

In strident terms, RUDE PRAVO recalled that Dubcek--now working in a forestry center in the Bratislava area--was put at the head of the party in January 1968 by "the rightwing opportunist and anti-socialist forces." He and other "liquidators" of the party, such

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\* The more conservative Slovak CP daily, Bratislava PRAVDA, did include a reference to the alleged invitation in its 13 December followup editorial article on the "Lessons" document anniversary, noting that "the allies came not only on their own decision, but at the request of thousands of communists and citizens from all strata of our population."

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as Smrkovsky, Kriegel, and Spacek, it said, conjured up "socialism with a human face," unduly stressed national specific features, and "gravely violated the interests of the party and its international traditions and principles." In effect conceding the continued appeal of Dubcek and his associates, the article added that they "are directly responsible, both morally and politically, for making many of our honest people waver."

The article noted that while Dubcek at present "remains in unenviable isolation," his alleged anticommunism has not slackened but increased. This fact, it declared, was borne out by "Dubcek's letter"--a letter of condolence to Smrkovsky's widow, published in the Rome weekly GIOKNI-VIE NUOVE in March 1974. RUDE PRAVO added that this letter, in which Dubcek defended his and Smrkovsky's leadership, was "a welcome windfall for the blackest and most inveterate anticommunist reaction." While Dubcek was stripped of his party membership during an "exchange of party cards" in 1970, the Husak regime has so far refrained from bringing him and other top 1968 leaders to public trial.

The article included only a single reference to Husak, stressing instead the unfinished work of "cleansing" the party which began in April 1969, the date on which Husak replaced Dubcek as party leader. Similarly, it included only one notable moderate feature--a statement of the regime's intent to continue with a "differentiated" approach toward those who have been expelled from the party.

Internationally, RUDE PRAVO underscored the crucial importance of Prague's alliance with Moscow, blaming anti-Sovietism for Czechoslovakia's "bitter" experience in the recent past and equating the combating of anti-Sovietism with "the defense of socialism itself."

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## AFRICA

## MOSCOW URGES MILITANT STAND BY LIBERATION FORCES IN RHODESIA

Recent Soviet commentaries on Rhodesia have urged the black Rhodesian liberation groups to adopt a tough, uncompromising position toward Ian Smith's white minority government, with Moscow's calls for militancy continuing even after Smith's 11 December announcement that a cease-fire in the guerrilla war had been negotiated. The Soviet militant urgings came after Prime Minister Smith rejected the demand for immediate black majority rule voiced at an early December conference in Lusaka attended by leaders of three Rhodesian liberation groups and the presidents of Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana. While urging militancy, Moscow radio commentaries to Africa have blurred the details of events by not distinguishing between the original Lusaka conference demand on 6 December for immediate majority rule and the later modification of this demand which was followed by Smith's cease-fire announcement.

Moscow's first commentary on the Lusaka meeting came two days after Smith had rejected the conference's initial call for immediate majority rule as a precondition for the cessation of guerrilla activities. A 9 December Moscow radio broadcast to Africa credited the "positive changes" in Mozambique and Angola with influencing other African liberation movements to "step up their fight," and hailed as a "major decision" the agreement by the banned Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), and the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI) to unite under the African National Council (ANC). Moscow did not delineate the demands of the Lusaka participants, noting only that the "racists" in Salisbury had rejected the "constructive proposals" of the "African representatives" and had replied with an "ultimatum" that the Rhodesian Africans cease their fight "against the present discriminatory processes in the country." Moscow recalled that the "Zimbabwe people" had made "no compromises with the racists in the past" adding that "there is even less reason for them to compromise today." Moscow's Radio Peace and Progress program for Africa on the 10th was similarly vague about the black nationalists' demands, noting only that the "concrete proposals" of the Lusaka conference were answered by "undisguised hatred and frustration among Rhodesian racists and their South African allies" who "intend to continue following the racist course" in the hope of frustrating the national

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liberation movement in Rhodesia. IZVESTIYA commentator Pilyatskiy's 11 December report on the Lusaka meeting, carried by TASS, cited the demand for immediate majority rule and called for the "intensification of the national liberation struggle" in order to "eradicate" colonialism and racism in Africa.

After Smith's 11 December announcement that agreement had been reached to end the guerrilla war immediately in return for the release of political prisoners and the holding of a constitutional convention, Moscow continued to obscure the meaning of the evolving situation. Commenting that events were "unfolding with unrelenting speed," a Moscow radio broadcast to Africa on the 12th depicted Smith's announcement as a "concession" motivated by Salisbury's fear of their "growing isolation on the world scene," while failing to report that the 6 December demand for immediate majority rule had been dropped by the Lusaka conferees. Radio Peace and Progress' commentary on the 13th accused Smith and South African Prime Minister Vorster of "coordinating" their efforts to preserve racism in Rhodesia, branding Smith's proposal to settle the Rhodesian issue a "neocolonialist maneuver" designed to "dampen African vigilance and support for the freedom struggle." The commentary suggested that the "only possible response to the racist intrigues is a greater armed liberation struggle." A 15 December Moscow Domestic Service commentary further characterized Smith's actions as an attempt "to delude world public opinion" in order to continue receiving economic and military aid from the "NATO patrons of the racists," and accused the "leading bourgeois mass media" of "collusion" with the Rhodesian authorities by describing Smith with "rapturous adjectives."

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## NOTES

MANSFIELD IN CHINA: Peking treatment of visiting Senate Majority Leader Mansfield has exceeded some of the protocol norms established for such visits, including Senator Mansfield's previous trip in 1972 with Senate Minority Leader Scott. NCNA described Mansfield's meetings with Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua on the 10th and with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on the 12th as "friendly and frank." (Chiao had also met Mansfield and Scott in 1972, before he was foreign minister.) A 4 July meeting between Teng and Senator Jackson had been characterized only as "frank" and many such discussions, including the ones last month with Secretary Kissinger, are not characterized by NCNA at all. (Chiao did term the Kissinger talks "candid" in a banquet speech.) Other signs of approval accorded Mansfield included an evening dinner hosted by Teng--Jackson had been given a meal at noon--and an hour-long meeting with Chou En-lai, according to AFP. Western press reports of Secretary Kissinger's recent meeting with Chou and of the Chou-Jackson meeting reported that they lasted for only about half an hour.

ROMANIAN RELATIONS WITH USSR, PRC: The communique on Romanian Foreign Minister Macovescu's 9-13 December "official, friendly visit" to the USSR served to reaffirm Bucharest's close ties to Moscow, the Warsaw Pact and CEMA. The two sides noted "with satisfaction" that Soviet-Romanian relations are "developing successfully" and along the lines laid down in the 1970 treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. They also pledged "to contribute in every possible way to the further strengthening of friendship and multilateral links among the socialist countries", as well as "to the consolidation of unity and cohesion, and to the development of cooperation among the Warsaw Pact members and CEMA members." A similar pledge was contained in the communique on Kosygin's visit to Bucharest to sign the 1970 treaty. SCINTEIA, as on that occasion, explained that its pledge applied to the development of relations with "all" socialist countries. This latter intention was underscored by the 6-14 December visit of PRC Foreign Trade Minister Li Chiang to sign a 1975 trade protocol providing for a "significant rise in exchanges," according to AGERPRES on the 14th. During a reception held by Ceausescu on the 12th, the two sides, as reported by Bucharest radio, "stressed with complete satisfaction. . . the close and traditional relations of friendship, militant solidarity and all-round cooperation of our parties, countries and people."

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PORTUGUESE RADIO PROGRAMS: Observations on the content of the evening "political hour" feature at 2105 GMT (2205 local) on Lisbon's Radio Club Portugues have confirmed a pattern which includes 25-minute programs by three political parties plus the Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA). The Monday night program, sponsored by the Portuguese Communist Party, was announced on 25 November. The Tuesday program is sponsored by the center-left Popular Democratic Party, whose first program was aired on 3 December. The Portuguese Socialist Party has the Thursday slot, with the first program appearing on 5 December. The MFA is sponsoring two programs a week, on Wednesdays and Fridays. In introducing the first MFA program on 29 November, the announcer said that the MFA broadcast would be a "program of the armed forces general staff, produced by the public information service of the armed forces," and characterized Radio Club Portugues as "the radio station of freedom." The Saturday and Sunday programs are devoted to music and sports, respectively. No right-of-center parties are represented on the feature, nor is there a program sponsored by the Portuguese Democratic Movement, which reportedly maintains a close relationship with the Communist Party.

TURKISH-LANGUAGE CLANDESTINE RADIO: The Turkish-language communist clandestine "Our Radio" announced on 14 December that effective the following day listeners could hear the "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" broadcasting on shortwave on Sunday and Tuesday nights at 0810 GMT (1010 Turkish time). The Voice of the Turkish Communist Party has been on the air since January 1971 with Thursday night programs on mediumwave for Turkish workers in Europe. The new shortwave broadcasts make the programs available to listeners in Turkey. The Voice of the Turkish Communist Party broadcasts are heard on frequencies used by Our Radio, which operates from East Germany and has been broadcasting since 1958. Our Radio has only occasionally carried statements and documents attributed to the Turkish CP. The new 40-minute shortwave program, monitored on 17 December, stated that "these broadcasts are eagerly awaited as much in our country" as by the Turkish workers abroad. Claiming that interest in the broadcasts was constantly increasing, the announcer said that all letters from listeners expressed a common wish for increased broadcasts two or three times a week. A commentary on this program called for basic party organizations to be established "among the masses in struggle," particularly in factories, faculties, barracks, and trade unions. Another item urged communists to penetrate, organize, and lead strike actions.

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A talk on conditions in Turkey asserted that when Turkish workers returned home from abroad for the holidays they would find a "deplorable situation"--shortages of many goods, growing unemployment, black marketeering, steep cost of living increases and inflation, as well as martial law in some provinces. As in Our Radio comment, the Turkish CP broadcast assailed the Justice Party and "reactionary politicians" such as JP leader Demirel for supporting actions by "fascist commandos" against "progressive elements."

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## APPENDIX

## MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 9 - 15 DECEMBER 1974

<u>Moscow (2443 items)</u>			<u>Peking (919 items)</u>		
Brezhnev Visit to	(23%)	11%	UNGA Session	(17%)	20%
France			[Korea Debate	(7%)	8%]
[Party-Government	(--)	2%]	[Charter Review	(--)	4%]
"Approval"			Debate		
Romanian Foreign Minis-	(--)	6%	[Draft Economic	(--)	3%]
ter Macovescu in USSR			Rights Charter		
[Joint Communiqué	(--)	3%]	Criticism of Lin Piao	(10%)	8%
China	(5%)	5%	and Confucius		
Soyuz 16 Flight	(4%)	4%	Indochina	(8%)	4%
			Thailand CP 32d Anni-	(--)	3%
			versary		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.